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Bioethics provides a fascinating starting point to study contemporary cultures, public argument, and intellectual history in the West. Bioethics emerged, in part, as a result of the scientific and technological developments in medicine. 
Another influence on the emergence of Bioethics in secular societies has been the 
emergence of moral pluralism that comes from respect for individuals and cultures. In 
tracing the evolution of the field one can more cleanly understand the challenges for 
secular Bioethics and the appeal, for many people, for a religious basis for Bioethics. 
I will argue that Bioethics in a morally pluralistic society will be limited in terms of 
its content. So, it is not surmising that people will also look to their own religious 
traditions to give content to their decisions. 
I. Defining Bioethics: The Emergence of the Field
In recent years there has been a good deal of reflection on the development of 
Bioethics as a distinct field.1 These reflections, though diverse, can serve as a basis 
1 Jennifer K. Walter, MD and Eran P. Klein, MD, Eds, The Story of Bioethics: From Seminal Works 
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for understanding the field and can help us understand the challenges for developing 
public Bioethics in a secular society.
If someone knew nothing about the history of medicine or Bioethics that person 
might wonder about the relationship of ethics and medicine before the emergence of 
Bioethics in the late 1960s.2 Contemporary discussions in Bioethics can sometimes 
leave the impression that there was no ethical reflection in medicine before the 
emergence of Bioethics. Of course, this is a false impression which is easy to correct. 
There has been long association of philosophy, ethics, and medicine dating to the 
ancient Greek schools of medicine and many of these associations have been about 
ethics. In the ancient world there were several different schools of philosophical 
reflection about medicine. One thinks of Hippocrates, Galen, Democrates, Plato, and 
Aristotle3 as examples of ancient philosophical reflections on medicine. However, 
these schools, though they differed in many respects, were primarily concerned about 
the conduct of the physician’s conduct in a paternalistic relationship. In addition 
to philosophical and medical reflection there has also been extensive theological 
reflections on ethics and medicine in many religious traditions.4 Indeed, one can 
argue that contemporary Bioethics emerged from the writing and reflections of 
theologians and religious thinkers.5
In light of this long history of ethical reflection involving medicine, one might 
ask: Why was there a need to develop a new area of ethical reflection that has been 
named Bioethics? Why not simply rely on the various traditions of medical ethics 
which already existed? I would argue that there are at least three developments that 
encouraged the emergence of Bioethics as a field distinct from the traditional sources 
of medical ethics. 
First, I will argue that traditional medical ethics was really physician ethics6 and 
to Contemporary Explorations (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2018).
2 I use the term field consciously to distinguish Bioethics from specific disciplines. While Bio-
ethics has been dominated by philosophical and legal thinking it is an interdisciplinary field 
engaging medicine, law, philosophy, theology, and many other disciplines. See Albert Jonsen, 
The Birth of Bioethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).
3 Paul J. Carrick, Medical Ethics in the Ancient World (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University 
Press, 2001).
4 Joseph Fletcher, Morals and Medicine (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960); Edwin F. Healy, Medical 
Ethics (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1956); Immanuel Jakobvits, Jewish Medical Ethics 
(New York: Block, 1958); Paul Ramsey, Fabricated Man (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1970); James Gustafson, The Contributions of Theology in Medical Ethics (Milwaukee: Mar-
quette University Press, 1975); Richard McCormick, Health and Medicine in the Catholic Tradi-
tion (New York: Crossroad Press, 1984).
5 Lisa Sowle Cahill, Theological Bioethics Participation, Justice, and Change (Washington, DC: 
Georgetown University Press, 2006).
6 H. Tristram Engelhardt Jr. and Kevin Wm. Wildes, “In The Beginning: The Emergence of Secu-
lar Bioethics”, in Advances in Bioethics: Bioethics for Medical Education, eds. R. Edwards and 
E.E. Bittar, (Stamford, CT: JAI Press, 1995).
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that the field emerged in response to the new choices and challenges brought about 
by the development of medical knowledge and technology. In the development of 
real choices in medicine there came a recognition that there are other people, beyond 
physicians, who are involved in medical decision making. A key influence in the de-
velopment of Bioethics was the development of scientific medicine. The nineteenth 
and twentieth century witnessed the grounding of medical epistemology in the basic 
sciences. The modern understanding of illness is rooted in an anatomical, physiologi-
cal, bacteriological, and now genetic causal factors. Changes in medical epistemolo-
gy in the modern age have been tied to new, scientific standards for the acquisition 
and validation of knowledge. One could argue, more accurately, that modern medi-
cine was born when the clinic and the laboratory became conjoined.7 This union of 
the clinic and the laboratory transformed medicine in a number of ways. The union of 
the clinic and the laboratory provided a basis for the development of scientific medi-
cal knowledge and related technological interventions. Laboratory research became 
essential to clinical practice and research.
In the contemporary world of medical miracles, we often forget the radical im-
pact of the scientific model on medical epistemology and medical practice. The joi-
ning of the laboratory and the clinic led to a transformation of medical knowledge 
and to the development of medical technology and interventions. From the develop-
ment of effective surgery to the manipulation of human genes, the physician, as me-
dical scientist, has been transformed from an observer to a manipulator of nature and 
the body. These scientific possibilities have led to the transformation of expectations 
and goals of medicine.8 
 For most of its history there was very little that medicine could actually do to 
help patients. Gradually, with each success, the social expectations of medicine have 
changed. In contemporary first world nations, people have come to think of medicine 
as curative.9 In the past people looked to god, or the gods, primarily for a cure. Cures 
often were thought to be miraculous. Medicine was looked to alleviate the suffering 
of patients but not, necessarily, to cure them. Today, in first world medicine, we 
expect medicine to cure patients. Some have argued that with the development of 
knowledge and technology the very purpose of medicine has changed.
The changes that have taken place in medicine have not only been driven by the 
development of medical knowledge and technology. They have also been driven, in 
part, by development of other technologies, like the automobile or the computer, or 
sociological developments like the urbanization of society. These types of changes 
7 H.T. Engelhardt Jr., “Recent Developments in the Philosophy of Medicine: The Dialectic of 
Theory and Practice and the Moral-Political Authority of Bioethicists”, paper APA Eastern 
Meeting, 28 December 2000. 
8 See, for example, David Callahan, False Hopes: Why America's Quest for Perfect Health is a 
Recipe for Failure (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998).
9 Eric Cassell, The Nature of Suffering and the Goals of Medicine (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1991).
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are important factors as they have made these new medical technologies accessible 
to men and women in society.10
While the development of medical knowledge and technology are necessary 
conditions to understand Bioethics, these developments alone are not sufficient to 
explain the emergence of this field. These scientific and technological developments 
are only part of the story. The creation of real choices and alternatives is a major ele-
ment in the emergence of the field. To understand other elements that contributed to 
the field it is important to recall that traditional medical ethics had relied principally 
on two sources of moral guidance. One source was the traditions of professional, 
physician ethics.11 The other source for traditional medical ethics was theological 
ethics which was well developed in a number of religious traditions.12 Why were these 
sources no longer able to guide the practice of medicine in its contemporary scienti-
fic practice? To understand why neither of these sources are sufficient for contempo-
rary medicine one must, I think, take the phenomena of moral pluralism and cultural 
diversity into account. What I mean by moral pluralism is the phenomenon in which 
people hold, not only different moral views on an issue (e.g., abortion), but also that 
they work out of different moral frameworks and methodologies.13 
The development of medical knowledge and technology creates real choices and 
decisions for people; especially patients. Traditional medical ethics had been focused 
on physician ethics and judgment about what was good for a patient.14 The devel-
opment of scientific medicine gave patients choices and options about the course 
of treatments to be pursued or refused. If the physician and patient shared the same 
moral values and way of thinking, such choices may not be all that problematic. How-
ever, when patients and physicians hold different views, the understanding of medical 
ethics needs to be transformed beyond the judgment of the physician alone.15 Deter-
mining what is in the patient's best interest cannot be judged by the physician alone. 
The physician may speak to the medical best interest of the patient but not, necessar-
ily, the overall best interest of the patient. To make such best interest judgments the 
patient needs to be involved. Furthermore, in secular societies there are likely to be 
different religious views that shape people's judgments about what is morally appro-
priate. That is why procedures like informed consent has come to play such a central 
10 See, K. Wildes, “Reshaping the Human: Technology, Medicine, and Bioethics”, Jahrbuch für 
Wissenschaft und Ethik, ed. D. Hüber, 227-236 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2003).
11  L. B. McCoullough, “Laying Medicine Open: Understanding Major Turning Points in the His-
tory of Medical Ethics”, Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 9 (1999): 7-23.
12 See note 7.
13 K. Wm. Wildes, S.J., Moral Acquaintances: Methodology in Bioethics (Notre Dame: Universi-
ty of Notre Dame Press, 2000).
14 Robert M. Veatch, “Doctor Does Not Know Best: Why in the New Century Physicians Must 
Stop Trying to Benefit Patients”, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 25 (2000): 701-721; Rob-
ert M. Veatch, A Theory of Medical Ethics (New York: Basic Books, 1981).
15 See Robert M. Veatch, Theory of Medical Ethics (New York: Basic Books, 1981).
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role in both clinical and research ethics. Such procedures allow people to exercise 
judgment about what is in their best interest.
Moral pluralism not only affects the relationship of patients and physicians. It 
also affects the profession of medicine itself. A key part of the classical notion of a 
profession was that there was a moral dimension to the profession. Many people still 
assume that professionals act in ethical ways and that it is reasonable to have fiducia-
ry expectations of professionals. However, with a more widespread moral pluralism, 
there will be different view about what is appropriate or inappropriate profession-
al conduct. From abortion to physician assisted suicide and economic structures of 
medicine one finds a wide range of opinions among physicians about what is appro-
priate behavior. So, it becomes more and more difficult to sustain claims based on 
an internal morality of medicine which had been a cornerstone to traditional medical 
ethics. The internal ethic of physicians becomes less and less tenable.
At the same time, one cannot assume, in a secular, pluralistic society, that theo-
logical ethics will supply the type of guidance that is needed. In several religious 
traditions there have been long, well developed reflections on medicine, its uses, and 
ethics. In light of these traditions it is not surprising that theologians played such 
an important role in the development of Bioethics. Many who first grasped the pro-
found impact of developing medical knowledge and technologies were theologian. 
They were often the first voices to raise broader social questions that transcended 
traditional physician ethics. As the field of Bioethics began to emerge it is not surpris-
ing that many theologians, working out of faith traditions that addressed questions 
of medical care, would be interested in these questions. These traditions had long 
standing reflections on medicine and health care. They were able to easily engage 
the changes that were taking place in medicine. Yet, fairly quickly, theology came 
to play less and less of a public role in Bioethics. The role of theology and religious 
commitments has been a difficult question not only for Bioethics but for many areas 
of public life in the United States. But, as ethicist Daniel Callahan has argued, Bio-
ethics became acceptable in America because it Apushed religion aside.16 Callahan 
does not argue that religious thought became irrelevant to these questions. Rather 
he argues as Bioethics became a form of “public” discourse17 it moved to more the 
more “neutral” languages of philosophy and law and away from the closed language 
of the medical profession and theological discourse.18
Third, the development of medical knowledge and technology often involved 
the investment of public resources and may be subject to public regulation. There are 
16 Daniel Callahan, “Why America Accepted Bioethics”, Hastings Center Report, Special Sup-
plement (1993): 8-9.
17 Arthur L. Caplan, “What Bioethics Brought to the Public”, Hastings Center Report, Special 
Supplement (1993): 14-15.
18 See L. B. McCullough, “Laying Medicine Open: Understanding Major Turning Points in the 
History of Medical Ethics”, Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 9 (1999): 7-23. 
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questions about how much a society should invest its resources into such research 
and technology. And there are questions about the extent of government regulation, 
and the justification for it, of emerging technologies. In a secular society, with differ-
ent religious traditions there will be real challenges to determine the extent and man-
ner for religious traditions and communities to have voice in the regulatory arena.
Bioethics then emerges as the result of several developments in contemporary 
secular societies. First there is the development of medical knowledge and technolo-
gy which expands options and creates real choices in medical care. With these choices 
the question arises of who is the appropriate authority to decide what is or is not ap-
propriate treatment. Such choices involve more than medical judgment. Second, the 
Bioethics emerges, in part, as a response to the multiculturalism and moral pluralism 
in secular societies like the United States. The emergence of different moral voices 
and views means that there will be differing views on appropriate medical care. Again, 
this judgment about what is appropriate care is more than a strict medical judgment. 
Third, the field emerges as a way to help people from different moral views navigate 
these choices and cooperate together. In studying the emergence of the field one 
can make the claim that Bioethics provides an insight into the life and practices of a 
society.
The tension of global and cultural ethics is a new version of an ancient problem. 
It was a problem faced by the Romans with their multi-cultural empire. Multi-cultur-
alism and moral pluralism represent a challenge for Bioethics in a secular society. The 
difficulty will be to avoid a complete relativism where only power wins the day or the 
simple assertion of a global ethic. 
II. Bioethical Consensus in a Secular Society
There has been an ancient tradition which intertwines Medicine and Ethics. Con-
temporary Bioethics reflects not only a change in the field but also represents sig-
nificant shifts in contemporary culture. There are rich traditions of medical ethics 
which are part of religious traditions. (examples/footnotes). And, there is an ancient 
tradition of medical ethics based in physician ethics (cites). Contemporary Bioethics, 
I would argue, drew out of these different traditions. And, I would argue that the 
shift came about for two reasons. One was the success and development of Medicine 
which offers people a wide array of choices and decisions. One of the key questions 
becomes the role of the patient, or her agent, in making those decisions, because 
contemporary Western societies are much more diverse and pluralistic. 
Bioethics is often understood as a field that resolves such moral controversies by 
appeal to reason. In trying to understand the claims that are often made for global 
Bioethics it is essential to understand the claims that are often made in the name of 
“bioethical consensus.”19 The notion of consensus is important for those who want 
19 One can argue that given the dilemmas of modern moral philosophy to speak about moral 
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to claim global Bioethics. The claims about consensus are something like a bioethical 
Ajus gentium in a field that understands itself as resolving controversies. The field 
must address questions about how well it is able to mediate and resolve bioethical 
controversies. Success in such resolution is crucial to the idea of global Bioethics. 
But, in order to gage the extent of such success it’s worthwhile to look below the 
surface of such consensus.
A. Pluralism and Consensus
Consensus can take place at a number of different levels: at the level of belief, it 
affects theory and cognition; at the level of action, it is pragmatic and practical; and 
at the level of values, it enables coherence and motivation. For consensus to play an 
important role in bioethical method one needs to understand which of these levels is 
being asserted. Thus, it becomes important to ask why a consensus exists.20 Is it mind-
less conformity? Is it about a submission to or support of existing power structures? 
Or is the consensus driven by the weight of appropriate evidence? Nicholas Rescher 
suggests that one should ask whether the consensus being appealed to is an idealized 
version of consensus or one that is practically attainable. Philosophers tend to use 
the former while social scientists deploy the latter. Understanding what is meant by 
consensus when it is used in Bioethics is important for exploring the extent and nature 
of normative claims. Also, it is important to understand at what level consensus at-
tributed. As I will argue, there are a number of judgments that are embedded in moral 
judgment and understanding where the consensus actually occurs is important. It 
could take place on a very general, broad level (e.g., Do good and avoid evil). But as 
a field Bioethics often addresses much more particular, specified judgments. So, when 
people appeal to a Abioethical consensus it is important to probe and understand 
what is being appealed to.
One way to understand the complexities of moving from general to particular 
judgments is to examine moral judgment. The nature of agreement, disagreement, 
consensus, and dissensus is best understood through an analysis of moral judgments. 
Of course, the questions of judgment take us back to the assumptions people make 
about the field of Bioethics. Is the field to function as the clinical Aanswer person 
or the clinical Solomon when there are moral disputes? Moral judgments should be 
understood not simply as choices about what should be done in a particular situa-
tion, but as involving logically prior judgments about how one justifies such choices. 
One’s assumptions about moral rationality are a prior judgment that commit one to 
truth that philosophers have shifted claims away from truth towards consensus. In Bioethics, 
for example, see, Jonathan D. Moreno, Deciding for Others (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1995).
20 Nicholas Rescher, Pluralism: Against the Demand for Consensus (New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1993), 15.
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a particular view of the moral world. For example, those in the natural law tradition 
understand moral rationality in a different way from those who deploy an instru-
mentalist view. Charting the geography of judgment reveals a number of points for 
potential agreement and disagreement. 
 The reality of moral pluralism in a secular society illustrates that there are many 
ways in which to construct the categories of the moral world. By distinguishing the 
three levels or types of judgment (object, justification, foundation) involved in moral 
argument, the spectrum for possible moral agreement and disagreement is greatly 
increased. It ranges from a strong sense of agreement, in which we are of one mind 
on how and why to proceed, to a weaker sense of proceeding together but only for 
a specific, limited venture.
The complex spectrum of relationships that lies between complete agreement 
at the levels of object, reason, and foundation to complete disagreement on those 
levels can be summarized under eight headings.
1. Object level agreement with agreement on justification and foundations.
2. Object level agreement with agreement about justification and dis-
agreement about foundations.
3. Object level agreement with disagreement about justification.
4. Object level agreement with agreement/disagreement in part on the lev-
els of justification.
5. Object level agreement with disagreement about both justification and 
foundations.
6. Object level disagreement with agreement on justification and founda-
tions.
7. Object level disagreement with justificatory agreement/disagreement in 
part.
8. Object level disagreement with disagreement about justification and 
foundations.21
The possibilities and the limits of each genus of controversy resolution in Bioeth-
ics can be analyzed under these eight headings. To reach agreement regarding justifi-
cation there needs to be prior agreement on what counts as a relevant moral appeal 
and what is a proper set of moral reasons to which one could turn. Unless moral 
agents stand within the same foundational framework, they will not reach agreement 
on how moral judgments are justified. 
Boyle's essay raises the difficulties associated with moral judgment. The more 
carefully one examines the complexities of moral judgment the more cautious one 
21 K. Wm. Wildes, S.J., Moral Acquaintances: Methodology in Bioethics (South Bend: University 
of Notre Dame Press, 2000).
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should become about the possibility of a global Bioethics. Even if there is significant 
agreement on a global level, which there often is not, it is hard to grasp how such 
agreement will help on the level of judgment which so often at the heart of Bioethics. 
The different levels of judgment point out the fragility of any claim for consen-
sus. The levels should make anyone skeptical of the depth of any consensus.
B. The Sociology of Agreement and Consensus:
The field of Bioethics has been marked by the work of numerous committees and 
commission on the national and international level. It is a field that has also been 
marked by the work of institutional ethics committees and review boards. The work 
of these groups has been important to establishing the credibility of the field. The 
work of various Bioethics commissions and committees provide examples of mor-
al agreement in a secular, morally pluralistic culture. Given that commissions have 
played an inspirational role in the development of Bioethics, it is important to exam-
ine how such committees and commissions achieve agreement. The sociology of such 
commissions raises important and interesting questions about what conclusions can 
be drawn from their work. The first question bears on the composition these commit-
tees. Usually people who are selected for such work are, at least, moral acquaintanc-
es. One rarely finds individuals with strongly different views appointed to the same 
committee or commission. In the selection of members, the committee's agreement 
is already being managed. A second question focuses on the committee's process. 
Such groups are shaped by a dynamic toward reaching a consensus.22 The expecta-
tion, before the commission begins work, is that the committee will reach consensus 
on certain recommendations. A third question focuses on the establishment of the 
agenda of the committee. Insofar as the committee is mandated to act in certain 
questions (and not in others) the possibility of disagreement is reduced. Notice how 
the work of such groups contrasts with the exchanges between individuals with great 
moral differences. 
The control of the agenda is a crucial point often overlooked in the heralding 
of agreement by committees. A necessary condition for resolving a moral dispute 
is consensus regarding the essence of the dispute. So often in Bioethics the most 
difficult problem is the lack of a common description of a moral controversy (e.g., 
abortion, assisted suicide). Is abortion about rights of choice or the killing of an inno-
cent human being? Is physician assisted suicide an act of mercy or an act of murder? 
If an agenda is established before a committee or commission begins its work, then 
the mapping of a general moral geography has already begun. The agenda not only 
22 See Jonathan Moreno, “Consensus, Contracts, and Committees”, The Journal of Medicine 
and Philosophy 16 (1991): 393-408; and J. Moreno, “Consensus By Committee: Philosophical 
and Social The Concept Aspects of Ethics Committees”, in The Concept of Moral Consensus: 
The Case of Technological Interventions into Human Reproduction, ed. K. Bayertz, 145-162 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994).
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identifies the problem, but also provides a way whereby differences are confined and 
minimized.
Understanding these sociological elements should lead philosophers and ethi-
cists to be cautious about how one should evaluate the claims of agreement and its 
depth. It is helpful to remember that agreements and disagreements can be found at 
a number of points in bioethical discussions. We simply need to be clear on what is 
being agreed to and not make extravagant claims.
 There are a number of interesting examples of consensus ethics and statements 
in public Bioethics. One recent contrast is the work of President Clinton’s National 
Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC) and President Bush’s President’s Council on 
Bioethics (PCB). Both groups examined the question of stem cell research. While 
there were similarities of opinions, each group reached differing conclusions about 
the direction, and ethical justification for, federal policy on stem cell research. When 
President Bush did not renew the terms of two members of the PCB who had dis-
senting views on embryo research23 it provided an interesting example of managing 
bioethical consensus. James Childress gives an older, though very insightful account 
of ethical consensus in the public forum.24
23 Scott Smallwood, “Bush Drops 2 Supporters of Embryo Research From Bioethics Pan-
el’, The Chronicle of Higher Educations, 1 March 2004 http://chronicle.com/prm/dai-
ly/2004/03/2004030103n.htm and “Two Scientists From Bush’s Bioethics Council Say Panel’s 
Reports Favor Ideology Over Facts”, G. Blumenstyk, The Chronicle of Higher Education, 8 
Mach 2004 http://chronicle.com/prm/daily/2004/03/2004030801n.htm.
24 James Childress provides an interesting and instructive case study in the management of 
agreement and consensus in Bioethics. Childress examines the deliberations of the Human Fetal 
Tissue Transplantation Research Panel (hereafter, HFTTR). In 1988 a moratorium was declared 
on the use of federal funds for HFTTR by Robert Windom, then Assistant Secretary for Health 
(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services). The National Institutes of Health appointed 
the HFTTR Panel in the fall of 1988 to respond to ten questions raised by Secretary Windom.
Even before it began work, Secretary Windom and the NIH had given the HFTTR Panel signif-
icant help in its task since the framing of issues directs the ways in which any moral problem 
can be resolved. The framing process itself can make the moral pluralism of a committee more 
manageable. In the case of the HFTTR Panel, Assistant Secretary Windom had set the agenda 
in his ten questions. Childress notes that Windom’s questions focused on the linkage between 
abortion and HFTTR practices. Indeed, Childress argues that Windom’s questions constrained 
the Panel’s deliberations. Childress himself makes the point that a different set of questions 
could have led to different outcomes. What is of interest here is that the process of delibera-
tionSand its outcomeSwere helped and directed by the charge given to the Panel. As one looks 
to the agreements and consensus of panels, commissions, or hospital ethics committees, one 
needs to examine how the boundaries and agenda of deliberation were established.Childress 
also addresses the issue of dissent in the panel's work. He says that two of the eleven members 
had substantial dissent. The two dissenting Panel members produced a dissenting report, such 
that Apanelists in the majority later expressed their concern that such a long and eloquent 
dissent would simply smother the report’s brief responses. Childress notes that an additional 
meeting of the Panel was called to structure the form of the final report so that it would not be 
overwhelmed by the dissenting report. The discussion of dissent raises two important ques-
tions. First, how much agreement is necessary to a consensus? If a committee is unanimous, the 
consensus is obvious. However, absent unanimity, and when there is strong dissent, the degree 
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Childress’s observations remind us that when people claim agreement, it is im-
portant to know what types of questions were asked and agreed to. His account rais-
es anew the question of how and what kinds of agreement are possible in a secular, 
morally pluralistic society. Contrary to the Jonsen-Toulmin experience in the work 
of the National Commission, Childress cites agreement on the level of principle.25 
It is possible that different methods of Bioethics may be appropriate to different 
activities. For example, issues of public policy, or institutional policy, may be better 
articulated as principles insofar as principles give broad guidelines for actions. At the 
same time, particular clinical issues may be better addressed by the agreement of cas-
es. Since method and content cannot be separated it is clear that different methods 
reflect different moral views.
Committees and commissions have come to play a central role in Bioethics. 
From local hospitals and nursing home ethics committees to national policy com-
missions, committees have taken on important roles in moral deliberations. As one 
examines the work of such groups, one becomes aware, however, of the importance 
of power and control in guiding the resolutions of such committees. The power to set 
the agenda, membership, and timetable are crucial to reaching any agreement. The 
Childress account helps us to understand how the agreement of such commissions is 
managed. It relies on both the agenda of the commission being set and the members 
of the commission not dissenting in bad faith. That such agreements are managed 
should not be surprising. Governments, like the people who run them, often seek 
the opinions of others to support a desired policy or to suppress an unpopular one. 
The Health Care Task force of the Clinton Administration assembled an ethics task 
force. Members of the task force shared some common assumptions about society 
and health care that were important for their deliberations.26 It is not hard to imagine 
how the conclusions of the committee would have been very different had its mem-
bership been altered in substantial ways. 
Again, a good example of such managed solutions in the presidential Bioethics 
of stem cell research. The Clinton Administration's NBAC made recommendations 
about the use of embryos for stem cell research which were more open and liberal 
than those made by President Bush's Bioethics Commission, it is clear from the guide-
lines that he set out that the recommendations will be much more conservative and 
of consensus is difficult to ascertain. Second, is the consensus based on the moral issues? A 
consensus report may play on certain ambiguities. Childress, for example, points out that the 
questions raised by the Assistant Secretary were empirical, legal, medical, scientific, and moral. 
As one listens to claims of consensus it is important to determine whether the consensus is 
actually about the moral questions.
25 Childress, 165ff. It is worth noting that Albert Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin offer a different 
account of consensus building. They argue that the National Commission reached consensus 
around cases (not principles) from which principles were articulated.
26 Norman Daniels, “The Articulation of Values and Principles Involved in Health Care Reform”, 
The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 19 (1994): 425-434.
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restrictive.27 The Commission will reach very different conclusions from the last pres-
idential commission because the membership is decidedly different and the contours 
of the questions have been set in very different ways.
Members are selected and agendas are set so that a desired result may be 
achieved. The members of the commission, unlike the Senate (in its role to advise and 
consent), are bound to the agendas given them. What emerges from this account is 
a picture of agreement that is often carefully managed and crafted. The result may 
be an agreement that is more causally achieved and less rationally justified than we 
craved. This confusion about the nature of agreement occurs often in Bioethics. The 
tendency is to draw principled conclusions when the conclusions are more sociolog-
ical in nature.
In many ways the very emergence of Bioethics as a field (section I) argues against 
any thick notion of global Bioethics. Bioethics emerged in response to questions 
of ethics in the clinic, medical research, and the development of public policy. It 
emerged, in part because there were new choices for patients and researches brought 
on by medical advances and the advancement of medical knowledge. But these choic-
es highlighted the differing moral views in a morally pluralistic society. And, even 
when views are held in common, there are differences in moral judgment as Boyle 
notes. Bioethics emerges as a field precisely because there isn’t a global ethic that 
men and women can agree to. Bioethics emerges because there is disagreement and 
what often passes for consensus is more a matter of illusion than substance. 
Just as there has been a great deal of emphasis in Bioethics on respect for per-
sons, and their judgments, the phenomenon of global Bioethics raises important 
questions about respect for cultures and cultural diversity. It is not often clear, and 
seldom explored, how global Bioethics do not degenerate into some form of cultural 
imperialism.
III. Possibilities and Limits for Public Bioethics 
As one examines the controversies in Bioethics it seems that the potential for a 
global bioethical consensus is limited. This ought not to be surprising in a morally 
pluralistic, secular society. Rescher notes that any talk or use of consensus must also 
investigate dissensus.28 Consensus and dissensus, like health and disease, dissensus 
are dialectical terms, and one cannot be understood without the other. In general, 
the over emphasis on consensus has led to an over emphasis on agreement and not 
enough attention being paid to disagreement.
27 See National Bioethics Advisory Commission, Ethical Issues In Stem Cell Research, June 
2000. For current documents by The President’s Council on Bioethics go to http://www.Bio-
ethics.gov. 
28 Nicholas Rescher, Pluralism: Against the Demand for Consensus (New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1993).
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That there should be dissensus in Bioethics is not surprising. If morality is part 
of a way of life and ethical reflection is grounded in moral experience, then different 
experiences will lead to different views of what is or is not morally appropriate be-
havior. One way to understand these different bioethical views is by using a moral 
relativist view. Often, when people use terms like moral pluralism they are employing 
a relativist position. The relativist view is that it really does not matter which position 
one holds on any matter. However, a problem with this view is that if one holds it, he 
or she will have no incentive to reach a consensus with anyone who holds different 
views. There is no reason for anyone to negotiate a consensus if he or she has no rea-
sons to hold any position whatsoever. Furthermore, the relativist view also leaves us 
with no intellectual or moral argument against the use of power simply to impose a 
position. We are left in a position where might makes right. An alternative argument 
would be that in a secular world, which may have many differing moralities, the only 
source of moral authority will rest with the human person. People are able to work 
together, morally, by consent and agreement. It is the web of agreement and consent 
that becomes the basis of moral authority in a secular world filled with many gods 
and commandments. 
In thinking through the language of global Bioethics it might be helpful to make 
a distinction. Morality is part of a way of life. It is often tied to particular cultures and 
communities. If one thinks about global Bioethics from this perspective it does not 
seem very useful. But, if one view the question in terms of respect for persons as mor-
al agents, then one can talk about a thin sense of global Bioethics in terms of respect 
for persons and cultures. In such a view of the world one can talk of moral friends, 
who live in a moral community and share a thick moral world view, moral strangers 
who have differing world views but who can cooperate in moral endeavors by using 
public, agree upon procedures of agreement and consent, and moral acquaintances 
who rely on proceeds but share some overlapping moral views. In such a world of 
respect and moral pluralism a person, and a community, needs to understand his/
her moral commitments. In such world a person and community will often face a 
question of cooperating with others in different moral enterprises. To maintain their 
integrity they will need to know their moral values so they can understand what can 
and cannot be compromised. 
An alternative approach, articulated by Rescher and helpful for Bioethics, is per-
spectival pluralism.29 This position holds that a person needs to have the Acourage 
of one’s convictions. One needs to know the positions she or he holds and how they 
differ from other positions. Such knowledge is crucial to compromise and consensus. 
These are essential to living out a notion of integrity. Any meaningful practice of 
global Bioethics will involve a respect for these differences, often significant, in a 
multi-cultural world.
29 Childress, 105.
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IV. Faith Based Bioethics
It is very understandable why, in a secular, pluralistic society like the United 
States a philosophical Bioethics would emerge. However, as one examines the con-
tent of such a Bioethics one will find it is very empty of meaningful content. And, in 
contrast, one will find that most religious traditions have very thick and rich content-
ful Bioethics for members of their communities. The challenge, for those religious 
traditions will be to decide how they want to interact with a contemporary morally 
diverse world. Some traditions will ignore the rest of society and live within their own 
frameworks and faith. Other traditions will try to convert others to their way of life 
and Bioethics. 
No matter how a community will encounter the broader society in which it lives, 
it will be important for communities most importantly to know their moral traditions. 
A moral tradition is to be lived and to be lived it must be known and understood. 
So, it will be important for members of a community to know and understand their 
tradition. That will be important for the members and the community. It will also be 
important for the broader, diverse society. A multicultural society is enriched by the 
communities which live within it. So, understanding and respect will help to enrich the 
society. At the same time, the society will be enriched, morally, by the diversity and 
living respectfully of other traditions and communities. 
Conclusions
Bioethics has emerged for a number of reasons. The development of medical 
technology has created choices where once there was only chance. Also, there are 
real moral differences about what choices should or should not be made. Yet, there 
is a need to find ways for people with different moral views to work together in 
medical research and delivery. As one examines the agreement in the bioethical con-
sensus one recognizes that the consensus may not be what people often hope that it 
is. Agreements in the field are not all the same. Nor are all disagreements the same. 
The more one understands the complexity of moral judgments, and the various types 
and degrees of agreement, the more one understands how limited the force of agree-
ments often is and how important disagreements are often masked. Scrutiny of the 
bioethical consensus reveals more dissensus than first appeared. 
A natural law method to Bioethics will yield general moral guidance but not 
specific judgments. An analysis of moral judgement leads to more modest views 
on the possibilities for a global Bioethics. Solomon also raises important questions 
about the possibilities for global Bioethics by posing the export problem. One can 
turn the problem around and see the essential dilemma in a different light. If there is 
really global Bioethics, can we import as well as export Bioethics or is there a Bioeth-
ics trade surplus? Even if there is “thick” agreement concerning a moral view of the 
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world, the application of the view will vary in particular judgments. Some may argue 
that this criticism is unfair as it is a problem for every systematic moral view. This 
would be a fair objection except that many in the field of Bioethics have portrayed 
the field as responding to very particular questions and moral controversies.
Even in the midst of moral pluralism and fragmentation many scholars hope to 
find some common moral ground. But, in contemporary societies marked by moral 
pluralism one can ask to what extent a jus gentium exists. One could argue that what 
does bind people of different moral views together is the role of consent of free indi-
viduals. Such a view also limits government intervention and regulation in bioethical 
matters. This common ground allows others, outside a moral community, to raise 
questions about the moral practices of a community. I have argued elsewhere that 
the realm of procedural ethics, based on consent and agreement, provides our best 
hope of a common ground. This procedural ethics will not provide the rich, think ethic 
that many long for in a global ethics. But it can provide a thin framework for limited, 
common moral conversation. One can understand the thin agreements of procedural 
ethics only if they are built on thicker, richer understandings of the moral life. Absent 
such overlapping values the procedures could not succeed ethically. Procedures need 
some form of moral justification if they are to be moral. If there are procedures that 
transcend moral communities then they may provide a way to identify the common 
ground of moral acquaintances. The agreement about procedures provides a way to 
articulate the overlapping agreements that exist for moral strangers and acquain-
tances.
In the end we are left with as many questions as answers. How might we explore, 
and respond, to the global questions that Boyle has raised about the ability to cri-
tique a particular moral community. How might we respond to the export problems 
raised by Solomon? If the domestic problems are as significant as he argues, can we 
even speak of a Aregional Bioethics? These questions are not trivial. As Bioethics 
continues to play a role in the development of health care policy, the way the field 
is conceived will have a direct bearing on the evolution of policy and the authority 
given to policy makers.
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